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[1] Taxation-Subjects of Taxation-Personal Property.--Leasehold interests in tax-exempt land are not "personal property"
within the meaning of Const., art. XIII, § 14, dealing with
assessment and taxation of per~oual property.
[2] Id.-Subjects of Taxation-Possessory Interests.-Possessory
interests in land are legislatively defincd as "real estate" or
"real property" for purposes of taxation (Rcv. & Tax. Code,
§§ 104, 106), and were so classified by judicial decision at the
time of adoption of Con~t., art. XIII, § 14 (1933), dealing
with assessment and taxatiun of personal property.
[3] Constitutional Law - Construction of Constitutions. - Terms
used in a constitutional amendmcnt must be construed in the
light of their meaning- at the time of adoption of the amendment and cannot be extended by legislative definition, since
such extension would in effect be an amendment of the Constitution if accepted as authoritative.
[4] Taxation-Subjects of Taxation-Personal Property.-Const.,
art. XIII, § 9a, dealing with ull~e('urcd assessments of properties, as amended in 1936 to include the phrases "and assessments upon possession of, claim to, or right to the possession
of land and upon taxable improvements located on land exempt
from taxation," indicates a change in the law and suggests
that the newly specified interests were not within the purview
of "per!lonal property" as used in the original provision, especially where the argument submitted to the voters in favor
of the amendment stated that it would "simplify the collection
on these property rights which the law says are real property
hut which are not land." As used in Const., art. XIII, § ga,
the term "personal property" therefore docs not include
possessory interests in land; the same term has the sallle
meaning in Const., art. XIII, § 14, dealing with assessment
and taxation of personal property, since the two sections are
in pari materia.
[1] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Taxation, § 61 et seq.; Am.Jur., Taxation,
§ 419 et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 38, 46; Am.Jur.,
Constitutional Law, § 64 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1,4-6,8] Taxation, § 43; [2, 9, 10, 14]
Taxation, § 60; [3] Constitutional Law, § 28; [7] Taxation, § 44;
[ 11-13] Courts, § 9-1.
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[5] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Personal Property.-l:llder Const.,
art. XIII, § 14, the Legislature is authorized to classify personal property "in pursuance of the exercise" of its power to
provide for the nssessment, levy and collection of taxes on
all forms of tnngible personal property, certain specified types
of intangibles, and any legal or equitable interest therein. It
cannot be assumed that the provision authorizing classifieation was intended to be broader in scope than the power it
was designed to implelllent.
[6] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Personal Property.-Sinee leasehold interests in tax-exempt land are not tangible personal
property, a specified type of intangible, or legal or equitable
interests therein, they nre not within the power of classification
set forth in Const., art. XIII, § 14.
[7] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Intangible Property.-Intangibles
other than those specified in the first clause of Const., art. XIII,
§14, are immune from taxation.
[8] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Personal Property.-Since leasehold interests in tax-exempt land are not "personal property"
within the meaning of Const., art. XIII, § 14, the first paragraph of Rev. & Tax. Code, § 107.1, stating that "A possessory
interest, when arising out of a lease of exempt property, consists of the lessee's interest under such lease and is hereby
declared to be personal property within the meaning of Section 14 of Article XIII of the Constitution" is invalid, but the
elimination of that paragraph does not disturb the scheme
of taxation set forth in the remaining paragraphs of § 107.1.
[9] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Possessory lnterests.-Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 107.1, dealing with taxation of possessory interests
arising out of 8. lease of exempt property, cannot be sustained
as a legislative interpretation of "full cash value" and "value,"
there being no suggestion of a legislative finding that a distinction as to substantial differenees in the value of possessory
interests in tax-exempt property, as dependent on whether
or not the interest was created, extended or renewed after a
certain Supreme Court decision, reflected actual differences
in the value of the interests involved.
[10] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Possessory lnterests.-The sole
purpose of Rev. & Tax. Code, § 107.1, dealing with taxation
of possessory interests arising out of a lease of exempt property, is to nlltigll.te the economic hurd ens imposed on lessees of
tax-exempt property when the SllDreme Court overruled an
earlier decision on the subject.
lie[11] Courts-Decisions as Precedents-Retroactive Effeet
parture.-Under traditional theory an overruled de~lI 1"

0.'

[11] See Cal.Jur.2d, Courts, § 116 et seq.; Am.Jur., Courts,
§ 44 et seq.
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considereu IIOt to have established bad law, but to have merely
misstated the law. The overruling decision is deemed to state
what the law was fr0111 the beginning, and is therefore generally
given retroactive etIect.
[12] Id.-Decisions as Precedents-Retroactive Effect of Departure.-The California Constitution permits an appellate court
to apply nn overruling decision prospectively only, though it
thereby temporarily preserves and applies a mistaken intcrpretation of the Constitution.
[13] Id.-Decisions as Precedents-Retroactive Effect of Departure.-The constitutional requirements of assessment and taxation at full value and in proportion to value are no less flexible
than other constitutional provisions; neither provision precludes the temporary and limited application of a rule once
approved by the Supreme Court, if reasonably designed to
mitigate hardships caused by its subsequent rejection of the
rule. Such temporary application of the rule of an overruled
case may be prescribed by appropriate legislation as well ns
by judicial decision, since the Legislature is no less compet('nt
than the court to evaluate the hardships involved and decide
whether considerations of fairness and public policy warrant
the granting of relief.
[14] Taxa.tion-Subjects of Taxation-Possessory Interests.-Rev.
& Tax. Code, § 107.1, dealing with taxation of possessory interests arising out of a lease of exempt property, is not an unreasonable exercise of the Legislature's power to mitigate
hardships caused by the overruling of established law. Rcntals
in leases of tax exempt property created before an overruling
Supreme Court decision were fixed at a level competitive with
rentals of private property on the assumption that the rental
value of the possessory interest would not be taxed, and the
decision changing that rule imposed an unexpected tax burden
on the lessees that their governmental lessors refused to mitigate by reducing rentals. Since adjustments in rentals under
the code section can be made in leases created, extended or
renewed after the Supreme Court decision, such lenses are
properly excluded from the operation of the code section, the
departure from assessment and taxation at full cash value
and in proportion to value being no broader than the hardship
to be remedied, and the last four paragrnphs of § 107.1 are
valid, not being that type of discriminatory taxation that
Const., art. XI, § 12, and art. XIII, § 1, were designed to
prevent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. George Francis, Judge.· Reversed with
directions.
* Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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Action for taxes paid Ullder prott'st. Judglllt'nt for defendants reversl'd with directions.
Holbrook, Tarr & 0 'Neill, W. Sumner Holbrook, Jr., Francis
H. 0 'Neill, 0 'Melveny & Myers, George F. Elmendorf, Bennett W. Priest, Lillick, Geary, McHose, Roethke & Myers,
John C. McHose, John F. O'Hara, Luce, Forward, Hamilton
& Scripps, James O. Hewitt, Ralph D. Sweeney, Howard H.
Taylor, J. Kerwin Rooney, Port Attorney (Oakland), and
Robert G. Cockins, City Attorney (Santa Monica), for Appellants.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Alfred Charles
DeFlon, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondents.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, James E. Sabine and Dan
Kauffmann, Assistant Attorneys General, and Ernest P.
Goodman, Deputy Attorney General, as Amiei Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-This appeal tests the constitutionality of
seetion 107.1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, which prescribes methods for evaluating the possessory interests of
lessees of tax-exempt property. L. W. Blinn Lbr. 00. v. Oounty
of Los Angeles, 216 Cal. 474 [14 P.2d 512], held that when
such interests are evaluated by the capitalization of income
method, deductions should be made from gross income for
rentals to become due under the lease and for amortization
of the cost of improvements by the lessee that would revert
to the lessor. De Luz Homes, Inc. v. Oounty of San Diego,
45 Cal.2d 546 [290 P.2d 544], overruled the Blinn case and
held that under the capitalization of income method there
can be no deductions for rental or amortization. Private
lessees of government property under leases made prior to the
De Luz decision complained that it was inequitable to apply
the De Luz rule to them, since their rentals were fixed on the
assumption that the rental value of the property would not
be taxed. Apparently in response to such complaints the
Legislature in 1957 adopted section 107.1 of the Revenue and
Taxation Code, which provides:
"A possessory interest, when arising out of a lease of exempt
property, consists of the lessee's interest under such lease and
is hereby declared to be personal property within the meanillg
of Section 14 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the State
of California.
"The full cash value of such possessory iuterest is the excess,
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if ally, of t he value of tite kase on the 0lwn market, as deter·
lIlilll'd hy til(' formula eOlltained in the' ease of De 1.11: Ilomes.
Inc. Y. COllllt!J of Sail Diego (19;)5), 45 Cal.~tl 546 l2~)O P.~J
544), ovel' the present worth of the rentals under said lease
for the lllle'xpil'ed term thereof.
"A possessory interest taxable under the provisions of this
section shall be assessed to the h'ssee on the sallle basis or
percentage of yaluation elllployed as to other tangible property on the sallle roll.
"This section applies only to possessory interests created
prior to the date on which the decision of the California Supreme Court ill Dc Lu" IImncs, Inc, v. County of San Diego
(1935), 45 Ca1.2d 546 [290 P.~d 544), became final. It does
lIot, however, apply to any of such interests created prior to
that date that thereafter have bl.'en, or may hereafter be, extended or 1'\'newed, irrespectiye of whether the renewal or
extension is provided for in the instrument creating the
iuterest.
"This section does not apply to leasehold estateE for the
production of gas, petroleum and other hydrocarbon substances
from beneath the surface of the earth, and other rights relating to such substances which constitute incorporeal heredita·
ments or profits a prendre."
Plaintiffs are lessees of certain lands and improvements
owned by the city of Los Angeles and located within its boundaries. Their leases were made prior to the date on whieh our
decision in the De Luz case became final and were not extended or renewed thereafter. Konetheless the assessor of Lo!';
Angeles County assessed their leasehold interests without
deducting the present worth of rentals for the unexpired terms,
on the ground that section 107.1 is void because inconsistent
with section 1 of article XIII and section 12 of article X[
of the California Constitution.
Plaintiffs appeared before the Los Angeles County Board
of Equalization and applied for reduction of their assessments
by such amounts as would result from the deduction of rentals
pursuant to section 107.1. Upon denial of their applil'atioll
they paid under protest the taxes levied for 1958 and instituted the present suit to recover the disputed amounts. The
trial court found that section 107.1 is ullconstitutional and
entered judgment for the defendants.
Section 1 of article XIII of the California Constitution
provides: "All property in the State except as otherwise in
this COllstitut ion providf'd .. , shall be taxl'(l ill proportion
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to its vulue, to be aseertaincd as provided by law ... ." Sedioll
12 of artide XI provides: "All property subject to taxation
shall be assessed for taxation at its full cash value." Plaintiff~,
contend that the foregoing provisions arc not applicable to
lL'asehold interests in tax-exempt property. They rely on the
first paragmph of sed ion 107.1, which declares that sueh
interests are "personal property" within the meaning of
section 14 of article XIII. Section 14 provides:
"The Legislature shall have the power to provide for the
assessment, levy and collection of taxes upon all forms of
tangible personal proprrty, all notes, debentures, shares of
capital stock, bonds, solvcnt credits, deeds of trust, mortgages,
and any legal or equitable interest therein, not exempt from
taxation under the provisions of this Constitution, in such
manner, and at such rates, as may be provided by law, and in
pursuance of the exercise of such power the Legislature,
two-thirds of all of the members elected to each of the two
houses voting in favor thereof, may classify any and all kinds
of personal property for the purposes of assessment and
taxation ill a manner and at a rate or rates in proportion to
value different from any other property in this State subject
to taxation and may exempt entirely from taxation any or all
forms, types or classes of prrsonal property."
Plaintiffs contend that section 107.1 simply exercises the
Legislature's power to classify "personal property" for the
purposes of assessment and taxation in a manner and at a
rate or rates different from other taxable property.
[1] Leasehold interests in tax-exempt land, however,
are not" personal property" within the meaning of section 14
of article XIII. The relevant paragraph of section 14 was
added to the California Constitution in 1933. At that time
section 3617 of the Political Code provided: "The term' personal property' includes everythin~ which is the subject of
ownership not in<:luded within the meaning of the term 'real
estate' or 'improvements.' " The samc section provided: "The
term 'real estate' includrs: 1. The possession of, claim to,
ownership of, or right to the possession of land .... " [2] Possessory interests in lanu had bern legislatively defined as
"rral estate" or "real proprrty" for purposes of taxation
since 1872 and are still so defined today. (Rey. & Tax. Code,
§§ 104, 106.) This court prior to 1933 had specifically recognized that poss(' ..,sory interests ill tax-('xpmpt laud are real
property for purposes of taxatioll. (Sail Pedro rtc. R.R. Co.
v. City of [,os AIIUd('s, 180 Cal. 18, 20-21 [179 P. :1!"l31 ; see
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1-1'* Cal. 148, 152-13;~
l77 1'. 8a2J.) Thu:; at the time :;edioll 14 of ariiele XIII was
adopted possessory iuterests in land, inl'ludillg lea:;ehold interests in tax-exempt land, had long been expressly elas>;ified by
both statute and judicial dl'cisioll as real property for purposes of taxation. [3] Terms used in a constitutional
amendment" must be construed in the light of thrir llleallin~
at the time of the adnpliull of the amenlllllt'nt, and call not be
extended by legislati\'e uefinitioll, for >;ueh extension would.
in effect, be an amendment of the constitution, if accepted as
authoritative." (Pacific G. & E. CO. Y. Industrial Ace. Com.,
180 Cal. 4a7, .:iOO [181 p, 788J.)
[4] The interpretation given to the term "personal
property" as used in section !)a of article XIII supports tIl('
conclusion that possessory interests in land are real property
for purposes of taxation. That section originally read: "The
taxes levied upon personal property for allY current tax year
where the same is not secured by real estate shall be based .... "
In 1936 the section was amended to read: "The taxes levied
for any current tax year upon personal property and assessments upon possession of, claim to, or right to the possession
of land and upon taxable improvements located on land exempt
from taxation, which are not a lien upon land sufficient in
value to secure their payment, shall be based . . . . " (Italics
added.) The insertion of the new phrases indicates a change
in the law (IJyatt v. Allen, 54 Cal. 353, 336; Hammond v.
McDonald, 49 Cal.App.2d 671, 681 [122 P.2d 332]) and suggests that the newly specified interests were not within tIll'
Jlurview of "personal property" as used in the original provision. Moreover, the argument submitted to the voters in
favor of the amendment state<l that it would "simplify the
collection of taxes on these property rights wh£ch the law says
are real property but whieh are not Jan(l. ... " (Italics added.)
As used in section 9a of article XIII, therefore, the term "personal property" does not include possessory interests in lan(l.
The same term has the same meaning in section 14 of artiele
XIII, sinee the two sections are in pari matcri(l.
Textual analysis of section 14 suggests the sallle result.
[5] The Legislature is authorize<l to classify personal propI'rty "in pursuance of the exercise of" its power to provid,'
for the assessment. levy, and collection of taxes upon all forms
of tangible personal property, errtain specified types of intallgibles, and any legal or eqnitabl!' iutC'rest til\' 1'!'iII. It cannot
hc asslIm!'d that the provision anthorizing ,·lassifi,'atioTl was

Bukl'l'sjicld etc. Co. v. ItCl'1£ Coullly,

July 1960]

Co. t'. COUNTY DI-'
450; G Cal.Rptr. 24, 353 P.2d 7361

FOlt"TElt RlIlI'ULnG.
154

C.~d

IJ. A.

437

intrnded to he hl'oHlh'r ill scope than the powC'l' that it \Va',
designed to imph·mellt. (Ro(,/II/! \'. County of Orange, 32 Cal.
~d 280, 285 [196 P .2<1 350].)
[ 6 ] Sinee leasehold j I1teresl';
ill tax-exempt land are not tangible personal propert~·, a
specified type of intangible, or legal or equitable interests
therein, they are not within the power of classification set
forth ill section 14.
[7] Moreover, we have held that intangibles other than
those specified ill the first clause of section 14 are immune
from taxation. (Roehm v. Coullty of Orailge, 32 Ca1.2d 280,
~85 [196 P.2d 550].) If leasehold interests in tax-exempt
land were "personal property," as the first paragraph of
section 107.1 purports to declare, they would apparently be
intangibles other than those specified in section 14 and e011sequC'ntly the remaining paragraphs of section 107.1 would bC'
void. Thus deference to the legislative interpretation of the
term" personal property," even if otherwise justifiable, would
only defeat the broader legislative purpose to tax leasehold
interests ill tax-exempt land.
[8] For the foregoing reasons we hold that leaseholfl
interests in tax-exempt land are not "personal property"
within the meaning of section 14 of artiele XIII and that the
first paragraph of section 107.1 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code is invalid. '1'he elimination of that paragraph, howe"er,
in no way disturbs the scheme of taxation set forth in the
remaining paragraphs of section 107.1. Even though not a
classification of "personal property," the remaining para·
graphs must be sustained if they can be reconciled with the
provisions of section 1 of article XIII and section 12 of artiele
XI on some other grounds. (See People v. McCaughan, 49
Ca1.2d 409, 416 [317 P.2d 974] ; Danskin v. Ban Diego Uni·
fied Belt. Dist., 28 Ca1.2d 536, 554-555 [171 P.2d 885] ; People
v. Lewis, 13 Ca1.2d 280, 284 [89 P.2d 388].)
[ 9] Plaintiffs contend that the remaining paragraphs of
section 107.1 do not violate the constitutional requirements
that all property be assessed and taxI'd "at its full cash value"
and "in proportion to its value," but merely prescribe a
method of determining the "full eash valne" and "value" of
a unique type of property, This method of determining valne
was held improper ill the De Luz ('ase, but plaintiffs maintain
that that case -.vas based upon a construction of "full cal\h
value" as used in the applic'able statutes rather than in the
Constitution. 'Ve (lo not, however, reach the question 0 1'
whether De IJuz dl'l'lared a statutory or a constitutional ruh-.
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Undcr ,,('dion 107.1 slIhstantial dil1'('I'OI('(':> in the valuatioll
of poss('ssory il1tc1"('sts ill tax.-exelllpt property tnl'n solely
on whether or 110t tile intt'l'l·~,t was crcated, extcuded, or renewed after the De IJuz ul'ci"iou. In making this distitH:tioll
the Legislature rel;t('<1 squarely, though mistakenly, on its
power to classify "personal propl'rt~-." There is no suggestion of a h'gislative finding that the distinetion refiec'is
actual differences in the valne of the interests involved, al1(l
no such finding could reasonably be ma(le. The seetion thert'fore cannot be sustained as a lcgi,;lati\'e interpretation of
"full cash value" and" value." (See Eisley v. Mohan, 31
Cal. 2d 637, 643 [H)2 P.2d 3].)
Section 107.1 partially reinstat('s the rule of the Blinn ca,;e
as the method for assessing and taxing interests created in
reliance ou that rule, "'hilc pr('sl'l'\'illg the rule of the Dc Luz
case for all other interests. [10] The sole purpose of the
section is to mitigate the cconomic bUl'llens imposcu on lessees
of tax-exempt property when this court overruled the BlinIl
case. The basic issues presented, therefore, arc whether the
Legislature has the power to drpart from assessment and taxatioIl at full cash value and in proportion to value by prescribing temporary application, of a principle onee approved
by this court, in order to miti~ate hardships caused by our
subsequent rejection of that principle, and, if so, whether
section 107.1 is a proper exercise of the power.
I n recent years much attention has been given to the problem of mitigating the hardships caused by an overruling of
established law. (See e.g., Freeman, Retroactice Operation 0/
an Over'ruling Decision, 18 Columb.L.Rev. 230; Kocourek &;
Koven, Stare Decisl:s, 29 Ill.L.Rev. 971; von l\1oschzisker, Stare
Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 Harv.L.Rev. 409; Snyuer,
Retrospective Operation of Overrllling Decisions, 35 ] 1l.L.Rey.
121; Spruill, The Effect of an OvuJ"uling Decision, 18 N.C.h
Hev. 199; 13 Mont.L.Rev. 74.) [11] Under traditional
theory an overruled decision is considered not to have established bad law, but to have merely misstated the law. The
overruling decision is deemed to state what the law was from
the beginning, and is therefore g-enerally giwlI retroactiv('
effect. (Collnty of Los Angeles v. PailS, 48 Ca1.2d 672,680-681
[312 P.2d 680].) III most jurisdidiuns, however, courts have
established exeeptions to the general rnle of retroadivity to
protect those who acted in r('liance 011 the overruled dt·eisiotl.
(See 21 C ..T.S. § 194, pp. 326-330, and eascs there t' ited.) Tit··
Supreme COUl·t of the l'nited States has held that the 'C'ni(pd
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States Constitution Joes not compel retroactive applieation
of overruling decisions. "A state in defining the limits of
adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself betwerll
the principle of forward operation and that of relation bat\,,,,a rd. It may say that decisions of its highest court, though
later ovcl'l'ulrd, are law none the lcss for intermediate transactions . . . wheneYer injustice or hardship will thereby be
averted." (Great Xorthern Ry. CO. Y. Sunburst Oil &; Refinillg
Co" 287 U.S. 358, 364 [53 S,Ct. 145, 77 L,Ed. 360, 85 A.L.R.
254].) State courts have grnerally found state constitutions
equally permissive and have frequently stateJ that the deeision
whether to apply an overruling decision retroactively or prospectively only turns Oil considerations of fairness and public
policy. (E.g., Arizona State Tax CO;)lIl1ission v. ElIsign, 75
Ariz. 220 [254 P.2d 1029] and 75 Ariz. 376 [257 P.2d 392] ;
State Y. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 51:t 517-518 [126 XW. 454, 455,
Ann.Cas, 1912B 691. 33 L,R.A, ~.S. 788] ; P(,ople ex reI. Rice
v. Graves, 242 App,Di,'. 128 [27:3 N.Y.S. 582, 587], aff'd. 270
N.Y. 498 [200 N.E. 288], cert. denied, 298 U.S. 683 [56 S.Ct.
!.l53, 80 L.Ed. 1403] ; see Menoes v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 500 [75
Am.Dee. 616] ; Snydrr, Retrospcctive Opfration of Oven'1ITil/O
Decisions, 35 Ill.L.Rey. 121, 140, and cases there cited.)
[12] We have hitherto recognized that the California
Constitution permits an appellate rourt to apply an overruling
decision prospectively only, even though it thereby temporarily
preserves and applies a mistaken intcrpretation of the COllstitution. (County of Los Angeles v. FallS, 48 Ca1.2d 672,
681 [312 P.2d 680].) [13] The constitutional requir('ments
of assessment and taxation at full eash value and in proportion
to value are no less flexible in this respect than other constitutional provisions. Neither provision precludes the temporary
and limited application of a rule once approved by this court,
if reasonably designed to mitigate hardships eaused by our
subsequent rejection of the rule. Such temporary application
of the rule of an overruled case may be prescribed by appropriate legislation as well as by judirial decision, for the Legislature is no less competent than the court to evaluate the
hardships involved and decide whether considerations of fairllegS and public policy warrant the granting of relief.
[14] Section 107.1 is not an unl'pasonable exercise of the
Legislature's power to mitil!1lte hardships ('auspd by the Overruling of established law. HClltals in leases of tax-exempt
property created before the De Lu7. ease were fixed at a level
competitive with rentals of private property 011 the assumption
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that the rental value of the possessory interest would Hot be
taxed. The De Luz case imposed an unexpected tax burdcn on
the lessees that their governmental lessors refused to mitigatl!
by reducing rentals, on the ground that such reductions would
constitute unconstitutional gifts of public funds. (Sec Cal.
Const., art. IV, § 31; Texa.s Co. v. County of Los Angeles,
52 Ca1.2d 55, 66 l338 P.2d 440] ; Conlin v. Board of Snpervisors, 99 Cal. 17, 21-22 [33 P. 753, 37 Am.St.Rep. 17, 21
L.R.A. 474] ; County of Alameda v. Chambers, 35 Cal.App.
537, 545 [170 P. 650].) The lessees were therefore required
to pay both rentals equivalent to rentals of private property
and taxes to which lessees of private property are not subject
because the full value of private property is taxed to the lessor.
Since ndjustmentsin rentals can be made in leases created,
cxtended, or renewed after the De Luz case, such leases are
properly excluded from the operation of the section. The departure from assessment and taxation at full cash value and
in proportion to value is therefore 110 broader than the hardship to be remedied. It is clearly not the type of discriminatory
taxation that section 1 of article XIII alld section 12 of article
XI were designed to prevent.
Nothing in Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Ca1.2d
35, 64-65 [338 P.2d 440], is inconsistent with the views expressed herein. In that case we considered merely the applicability of the judicially developed rule set forth in Oonnty
of Los Angeles v. Falls, 48 Cal.2d 672, 681 [312 P.2d 680].
Neither the Faus rule nor our opinion in the Texas Company
case reflects constitutional limitations on when the type of
relief provided by section 107.1 may be given.
We hold, therefore, that the last four paragraphs of section
107.1 are valid and that plaintiffs are entitled to recover thl'
excess of the taxes paid under protest over the amounts that
would have been levied if the assessor had complied with
section 107.1.
The judgment is reversed and, pursuant to stipulation b~'
counsel, the trial court is directed to remand the case to the
Los Angeles County Board of Equalization for hearing upon
the matter of assessing plaintiffs' possessory interests according to the terms ofsection.107.1 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J.,
and Dooling, "'., concurred.
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